Alice B. Ring v. Wallace H.  Ring : Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972
Alice B. Ring v. Wallace H. Ring : Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Ring v. Ring, No. 12961 (Utah Supreme Court, 1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3237
[. 
,; 
r 
Ji IN THE sue :,,, 
r OF THE ··: ·•y{:': 
IDWAR.D M. 
A#omeyfor 
520 Qmtinental 
lalt Lake City, Utd:· 
INDEX 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE ------------------------------------------------ 1 
DISPOSITION BELOW -------------------------------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------ 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING 
THE CUSTODY PROVISIONS OF THE DECREE 
ON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT -------------------------- 4 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CON-
TROLLING WEIGHT TO APPELLANT'S IN-
COME IN FIXING THE LEVEL OF ALIMONY 
AND IN EXCLUDING ALL TESTIMONY AS TO 
OTHER FACTORS BEARING ON THE PRO-
PRIETY AND ADEQUACY OF ALIMONY ---------- 7 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT AN 
INCREASE IN APPELLANT'S EARNED IN-
COME WAS A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE 
COMPELLING ALIMONY ELIMINATION EVEN 
IF THE STIPULATION DID NOT CONTEM-
PLATE SUCH INCREASE -------------------------------------- 11 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
TION IN MODIFYING A DECREE BASED UP-
ON STIPULATION IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY 
SHOWING OF HARDSHIP -------------------------------- 14 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
INDEX (Continued) 
Page 
CASES OTED 
Allen v. Allen, 25 U 2d 87, 475 P 2d 1021 ____________________ 11 
Brody v Brody, 252 NY Supp 2d 1008 ---------------------------- 13 
Christensen v. Christensen, 294 NW 154, 295 Mich 203 13 
Felt v. Felt, 27 U 2d 103, 493 P 2d 620 ---------------------------- 11 
Harter v. Harter, 11 NW 2d 880 -------------------------------------- 13 
McDonald v. McDonald, 120 U 573, 236 P 2d 1066 ____ 8 
Pinion v. Pinion, 92 U 255, 67 P 2d 265 -----------------------· 8 
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 20 U 2d 360, 438 P 2d 180 ---------- 15 
Wilson v. Wilson, 5 U 2d 79, 296 P 2d 977 --------·-·-···--- 8 
TEXTS CITED 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
24 Am Jur 2d 907 ----------····---·-··---·-·--------·-··············· 6 
24 Am Jur 2d 928 --·--··-·····-·················-················--6 
24 Am Jur 2d 789 --······-····--·--············-········-·········---16 
AMERICAN LAW REPORTS 
18 ALR 2d 62 ·············-······--·································· 14 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE B. RING, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS. 
WALLACE H. RING, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
12961 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Honorable Merrill 
C. Faux modifying a decree of divorce with regard to alimony 
and child custody. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The trial court modified the decree ( 1) to eliminate any 
obligation to pay alimony and ( 2) to so expand the Respon-
dent's "visitation rights" that he in fact has custody of the 
parties' three children during one or two months per year. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the modification order pri-
marily as it relates to custody and secondarily as it relates to 
elimination of alimony. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Complaint in the original divorce action was filed in 
April of 1967 (R-1). In December of that year, a counterclaim 
was filed ( R-10) . The action was never tried; a decree based 
on stipulation was entered on September 19, 1968 ( R-22). 
Throughout the marriage of the parties', Appellant pro-
duced income for the family by practicing her profession on a 
more or less part-time basis (R-131 et seq). She received as 
much as $915.00 per month for that activity (R-132). At the 
time the decree was entered, she was making $6,996.68 per year 
(Exhibit 2D) . She was at all times licensed to practice medi-
cine and surgery. 
After the decree, Appellant prepared to practice full-time. 
She selected a specialty, public health, which would permit reg-
ular hours to be devoted to her children (R-139). To this end, 
she completed graduate training at the University of California 
( R-90), and became Assistant Regional Director for Health 
Manpower in the P.H.S. offices in San Francisco (R-91). This 
is a civil service position for which the salary is $25,620.00 per 
year. 
Although she has increased her dollar income by some 
$19,000.00 per year since the decree was entered, Appellant 
incurs expenses for transportation to and from her place of 
work, for parking, for insurance, for entertainment, for out of 
state travel and for the maintenance of her home, all of which 
would be unnecessary if she chose not to be productive. These 
are estimated to consume about $200.00 per month (R-140 et 
seq). The really major expense items, however, are taxes, esti-
mated at $7 ,200.00 per year ( R-140) and child care, presum-
ably about $3,100.00 per year (Exhibit 4-P). 
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The trial court refused to hear testimony with regard to 
comparative costs of living as between Salt Lake and San Fran-
cisco ( R-141 ) . The court further refused to receive evidence 
relating to the sources of the family income during the decade 
of the parties' marriage ( R-15 2 statement of court with regard 
to Exhibit 3-P, offered and refused), or the degree to which the 
parties were influenced by tax considerations in dividing the 
support payments to which they stipulated (and which were 
incorporated in the original decree) as between spousal and 
child support ( R-143). 
During the period since the divorce, Respondent's annual 
dollar income has increased from $29 ,500.00 ( R-108), to 
something in excess of $40,000.00, of which $35,000.00 is paid 
in taxable salary and bonuses (R-106) and "more than" 
$5,000.00 is paid in non-taxed contributions to a profit sharing 
plan and insurance benefits ( R-116) . 
With regard to Respondent's exercise of his visitation 
rights during the years after the divorce when the children were 
in Salt Lake, the evidence is that he saw the children "sporad-
ically" (R-144) and would stay away from them "for long 
periods of time - a month or more" (R-145). While Appel-
lant was completing P.H.S. training at Berkeley and the child-
ren were with her, Respondent made little effort to communi-
cate with them. One summer, he asked the children if they 
would like to take a river trip with him, but he refused to pay 
their transportation to and from Salt Lake ( R-119, 146) . 
In any event, it is clear that Appellant has been most con-
siderate and cooperative in making the children available to 
their father. Four years elapsed between the filing of the com-
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plaint and the filing of the petition to modify the decree. Dur-
ing those important, formative years of the children's lives 
Respondent showed little disposition to enjoy their company. ' 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING 
THE CUSTODY PROVISIONS OF THE DECREE 
ON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT 
At the time of the decree, the parties stipulated that Ap· 
pellant should have custody of the children subject to "reason· 
able visitation rights." Respondent's petition for modification 
sought, and the court granted, a basic alteration of the custody 
situation on no evidence except that Appellant had found it 
necessary or expedient to take employment and residence in 
California. 
We are aware that Respondent and the trial court looked 
upon the order that the children spend two months per year in 
their father's home as a mere clarification of "reasonable visita· 
tion rights." We submit, however, that the placement of these 
children for two months each year in a different home, in a 
different city under the supervision of a person whose attitudes 
and concepts of right conduct are at strong variance from Ap· 
pellant's is a change in their custody. The person who has the 
custodial responsibility makes decisions and establishes patterns 
with regard to such things as church attendance, personal hy· 
giene, and entertainment, and imposes an overall discipline. 
A parent with mere visitation rights can exercise no such funda· 
mental influence. 
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The parties agreed, and the court concurred in 1968, that 
Appellant should have the sole and exclusive custody of these 
children and set the tone of their upbringing. Appellant has 
taken special pains to realize her professional potential in a 
manner which permits her to be home most of the time when 
the children are home. There is not a word in the record to 
suggest that she has failed in any respect to give the children 
guidance and wholesome example. 
In the six years between Respondent's 1966 departure 
from the home of the parties' and his filing of the petition for 
modification in 1972, Respondent demonstrated little desire 
for the companionship of his children. He would leave them 
alone for weeks at a time when he had easy access to them. 
When they lived in California, he chose to travel extensively in 
Europe and Mexico in preference to visiting them. He cancelled 
a proposed river trip with the children because he couldn't 
afford to pay the costs of their transportation to and from Salt 
Lake 
The record simply doesn't reveal a change in circumstances 
which justifies the court in taking the children from their 
mother for months each year. If there was reason for divided 
custody in 1968, Respondent should have insisted upon it or 
submitted the matter to the court. Having stipulated that the 
circumstances were such that Appellant should have full cus-
tody, Respondent should be required to show some failure on 
Appellant's part to meet the demands of custody if he now feels 
constrained to assume a true parental role. 
Obviously, when a marriage ends and children are involv-
ed, sympathy can be engendered for both parents in their en-
deavors to maintain relationships with their children. There 
are many arguments that can be made for a split custody ar. 
rangement. Children may require both masculine and feminine 
influences. A father may need and deserve the companionship 
and affection of his children as much as a mother. All these 
are arguments which should be made at the time of the divorce 
proceedings. Once the decree has been entered, the same basic 
judicial philosophy applies to custody provisions as to property 
settlement and support provisions; the parties should be able 
to rely on the finality of the decree. 
The standard texts treat the subject of custody at great 
length, and little purpose would be served by quoting at length 
from them. We feel, however, that the following excerpts 
from the American Jurisprudence Treatise on Divorce and Sep-
aration are particularly relevant. 
"The doctrine of res judicata applies to that part 
of the divorce decree which grants custody, and the 
court cannot re-examine the facts formerly adjudicated 
and make a different order thereon. It is accordingly 
stated broadly that there must be a substantial change 
of circumstances presenting a new case before the court 
may make a substantial change in the custody order. 
The ordinary doctrine of res judicata contemplates 
that an adjudication operates not only as to matters 
actually litigated and decided but also as to matters 
which could have been but were not litigated, so long 
as the parties and the cause of action are the same." 
( 24 Am Jur 2nd 928) 
"A court which is charged with the duty of award· 
ing the custody of a minor child has the power to divide 
or alternate the custody of a child between the parents 
or other persons, as by awarding custody to one person 
for 6 months or more and then to another person for 
6 months or less, and to repeat the shifting of custody 
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each year. Nevertheless, the courts frequently criticize 
th~ practice of dividing or alternating the custody of 
children for equal periods of time, and have said that 
divided custody should be avoided whenever it is rea-
sonably possible to do so, and that divided custody will 
not be approved except under very exceptional circum-
stances. Divided custody is not considered to be in the 
best interests of a child; if a child is shifted from home 
to home and from city to city it will have no real home 
and no permanent environment and associations." ( 24 
Am Jur 2d 907) 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CON-
TROLLING WEIGHT TO APPELLANT'S IN-
COME IN FIXING THE LEVEL OF ALIMONY 
AND IN EXCLUDING ALL TESTIMONY AS TO 
OTHER FACTORS BEARING ON THE PRO-
PRIETY AND ADEQUACY OF ALIMONY. 
The evidence that Appellant has increased h~ annual 
dollar income since the date of the decree is, of course, uncon-
trovertible. The court refused to hear any testimony as to the 
basis on which the spousal and child support levels of the 1968 
stipulation were fixed, and ruled, in effect, that a wife is en-
titled to no continuing support from her husband if, after their 
divorce, she begins producing income sufficient for her reason-
able needs. 
In essence, the trial court adopted the concept that the one 
factor which can even be considered in determining whether a 
husband must contribute to his wife's support after divorce is 
her need of that support. 
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The attitude of the trial court in this regard is at serious 
variance with that of this court as expressed periodically over 
the years. Perhaps the most recent occassion for discussing the 
factors which should control in fixing alimony (where the 
parties cannot agree and that responsibility is imposed on the 
trial judge) was Wilson v. Wilson, 5 U2d 79, 296 P2d 977. 
An apt quote from that decision is found at page 83 of the Utah 
Reporter: 
"The court's responsibility is to endeavor to pro-
vide a just and equitable adjustment of their economic 
resources so that the parties can reconstruct their lives 
on a happy and useful basis. In doing so it is necessary 
for the court to consider, in addition to the relative guilt 
or innocence of the parties, an appraisal of all of the 
attendant facts and circumstances: the duration of the 
marriage; the ages of the parties; their social positions 
and standards of living; their health; considerations 
relative to children; the money and property they 
possess and how it was acquired; their capabilities and 
training and their present and potential incomes." 
The same point of view is expressed in Pinion v. Pinion, 92 U 
255, 67 P2d 265, and McDonald v. McDonald, 120 U 573, 
236 P2d 1066. 
It is noteworthy that the quoted language from Wilson 
in no sense ties the support obligation to the income of the 
wife at the time the decree is entered. The incomes of the parties 
is the last factor to be mentioned, and then it is emphasized that 
not just the "present" income but the "potential" income should 
be considered. It is not the income of the wife but her capacity 
to produce income which determines her need of support. 
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In the instant case, the parties were represented by counsel 
when they executed their stipulation, and it must be assumed 
that they reached their decision about the appropriate family 
support obligation to be assumed by Respondent by evaluating 
the factors identified as relevant by this court. 
With reference to those factors, the court in 1968 found 
that Respondent used abusive language to Appellant, disclaimed 
affection for her, threatened to leave her and in fact left the 
home of the partes' on August 1, 1966. There is otherwise 
nothing in the record to indicate where the fault for the mar-
riage disintegration lies. 
We know that the marriage lasted for more than a decade, 
that three children were born, that the parties are old enough 
to have been medical students in 1956, and that Appellant was 
a source of significant income for the family throughout the 
marriage. All these are circumstances which favor the imposi-
tion of alimony obligation. 
With regard to Appellant's actual and potential income 
at the time of divorce, the record reveals her actual income, and, 
if the court resorts to data which is well within the scope of 
Judicial notice, her potential income can be determined with 
reasonable accuracy. The 1971 Edition of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce's Statistical Abstract of the United States reports 
the median annual income of general practitioners in the United 
States (after tax-deductible professional expenses) to have been 
$31,370.00 in 1967, rising to $32,990.00 in 1968. Since Ap-
pellant was properly categorized as a general practitioner in 
1967 and had maintained her skills during a decade of at least 
part-time practice, her potential income was somewhere near 
the median at the time of the divorce. 
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While the court would hear no testimony on how the 
parties evaluated Appellant's income potential when they made 
their stipulation, the record is not entirely devoid of evidence 
on this sub jeer. In his counterclaim ( R-10-12 ) , paragraph 5, 
Respondent represents to the court that Appellant "is a physi-
cian and surgeon and is capable of earning sufficient income 
to support herself." This representation was true; subsequent 
history has proved it, and the parties were perfectly aware of it 
when they made their stipulation. If the record supports any 
presumption, it is the presumption that the parties agreed Re-
spondent should pay $800.00 per month in family support 
even though Apellant could and would produce mcome near 
the average of general practitioners. 
Another factor which this court considers significant with 
regard to alimony is how the parties acquired their marital 
estate and achieved their financial position. Here again, the 
trial court refused to receive evidence. Appellant offered Exhibit 
3D, however, which reveals, even without supporting testimony, 
that Respondent achieved his stature in the medical community 
and qualified to command the more than $40,000.00 annual 
income he now enjoys because Appellant supported the family 
whenever Respondent wanted to take the time for residency or 
other training necessary for certification in his specialty. The 
only real assets the parties owned at the time of their separation 
were their medical credentials, and Respondent's education was 
basically purchased by Appellant. The parties stipulated and 
the court concurred, in 1968, that Appellant should share the 
fruits of Respondent's exalted medical status. The mere fact 
that she began to produce income (as the parties anticipated) 
after the divorce is hardly a valid reason for taking from her 
an asset for which she paid. Clearly, a wife's income from an· 
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ticipated employment is not a proper basis for reduction of 
alimony. This court so held in Allen v. Allen, 25 U2d 87, 475 
P2d 1021. 
It is significant, we submit, that it was only after Respond-
ent had completed his residency and begun to enjoy a specialist's 
income that he left Appellant. The equities do not favor elimi-
nation of alimony in the circumstances of this case. 
All the above are facts which were clearly known and 
contemplated by the parties when they stipulated for divorce. 
They are obvious facts even if no recital of them appears in the 
formal stipulation. This court has recently spoken on the duty 
of the trial court in this situation. In Felt v Felt, 493 P2d 620, 
27 U2d 103, the court said: 
"In doing so, we affirm our previous pronounce-
ments that a divorce decree containing awards for sup-
port based on either expressed or assumed facts con-
templated by the parties or the court or both, should 
not be modified when the contemplated facts are ob-
vious or agreed to by the parties and in turn incorporat-
ed in the decree, in which event the continuous juris-
diction of the court to modify should not be used to 
thwart the expressed or obvious intentions of the parties 
and/ or the court ... " 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT AN 
INCREASE IN APPELLANT'S EARNED IN-
COME WAS A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE 
COMPELLING ALIMONY ELIMINATION 
EVEN IF THE STIPULATION DID NOT CON-
TEMPLATE SUCH INCREASE 
The evidence in this case is that Appellant's dollar income 
has increased, since the date of the decree, by some $19,000.00 
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per year. Of that, however, she must pay approximately $13,-
000.00 in taxes, costs directly attributable to her employment 
status, and costs of providing adequate supervision for the 
children while she is away. Her real income has increased by 
an amount which merely permits her family of four to live 
nicely but not luxuriously so long as Respondent contributes 
as he agreed. 
The trial court would not permit testimony about the 
higher costs of San Francisco living and ruled that, if Appellant 
chose to accept California employment, her purchasing power 
must nevertheless be evaluated by Utah standards for purposes 
of determining whether there has been a change in financial 
circumstancs. We submit that the trial court's position in this 
regard is patently illogical and unrealistic. 
We do not deny, however, that Appellant's financial 
position has improved by reason of her employment. She could 
undoubtedly cope if she received no support from Respondent. 
The question is not whether she could cope but whether she 
should be required to. 
We have already commented upon the circumstances 
which, in equity, entitle Appellant to share the fruits of Re· 
spondent's elevated earnings as a specialist. It is of passing 
interest that his annual earnings, since the divorce, have in-
creased by some $11,000.00, half again as much as he was 
required to pay in alimony. He has assumed no new financial 
responsibilities. 
Our major point is that (even where the parties have not 
stipulated to alimony anticipating the wife's return to employ· 
ment) it is not in the interest of society that a wife should 
be penalized for being industrious once the level of suppart 
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to which she is entitled from her husband is established by a 
divorce decree. 
We have been unable, in our research, to discover a single 
case where an alimony award has been reduced because the wife 
began earning money except where it has been apparent that 
the payment of the originally decreed alimony worked a serious 
hardship on the husband. Where it is obvious that the original 
alimony was set at a level which reduced the husband to a 
sub-marginal living standard, but no other source of support 
for the wife was available, the courts have granted the husband 
some relief when the wife has begun to earn. 
In Christensen v. Christensen, 294 NW 154, 295 Mich. 
203, the trial court suspended alimony payments where the 
husband was making $1,800.00 per year and, after the divorce, 
the wife begain making $2,200.00 per year. The Michigan 
Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the alimony, saying: 
"Plaintiff's self-efforts do not in any degree afford 
release of defendant." 
The Michigan court reaffirmed that position in Harter v. 
Harter, 11NW2d880. 
In Brody v. Brody, 252 NY Supp 2d 1008 ( 1964), the 
New York court made this statement on the subject: 
"A wife, separated by decree from her husband, 
should be encouraged to devote her energies in an effort 
to make herself economically useful. Her right to sup-
port under the decree at the hands of her husband 
should not be limited merely because, in an effort to 
promote self-respect and to acquire a measure of _inde-
pendence and future security, she seeks to keep mtact 
her capital assets and she devotes herself to some em-
ployment or occupation resulting in earnings, small or 
large." 
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This subject is annotated in 18 ALR 2d. A relevant quote 
from page 62 of the annotation, supported by a dozen cited 
cases is this: 
"The mere fact that the wife has secured employ. 
ment or that her income has increased since the entry 
of the decree for alimony or maintenance does not 
automatically require a reduction in or termination of 
payments, since the circumstances may be such that it 
will be just to permit the wife to receive the alimony or 
maintenance in addition to her income from personal 
services." 
In the instant case, there is special cogency to the argu-
ment that a wife should not be discouraged from becoming 
economically productive after divorce. Appellant's skills are 
in tragically short supply in our society. The failure of 
America's medical schools to keep pace with the desperate need 
(let alone the demand) for medical services is a national scan-
dal. Appellant is employed in a program designed to distribute 
medical services among the disadvantaged. 
Obviously, this is not a usual case, but it points up the 
shortsightedness of any judicial policy which removes the in-
centive for a wife to become productive. It is neither natural 
or necessary that a woman stagnate after a divorce in order to 
enjoy the right of support which a court has decreed she 
deserves, 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN MODIFYING A DECREE BASED UPON 
STIPULATION IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY 
SHOWING OF HARDSHIP 
There is, of course, an impressive support for the propo· 
sition that a court may, where it appears that changes in the 
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-
circumstances of the parties since a decree of divorce justify it, 
modify the decree as it relates to alimony, support, and custody. 
This court has, however, emphasized that a divorce decree is a 
final judgment and is not lightly to be altered. The trial court 
must be convinced that considerations of equity and justice 
compel that the obligations of the parties be modified. 
A recent expression on the subject is found in Sorenson 
v. Sorenson, 20 U2d 360, 438 P2d 180. The court then said: 
"The rules governing modification of the alimony 
portion of a divorce decree grant the trial court the 
advantage of some discretion, since the parties are 
usually before the court and a sounder appraisal of the 
situation can be made. Generally, the court is required 
to give such a decree the final status accorded to any 
civil judgment and to apply the doctrine of res judicata 
thereto. The parties should be entitled to rely on the 
finality of the alimony award in determining the right 
to receive and the duty to pay. Our statute permits sub-
sequent changes which are reasonable and proper. This 
has been construed to empower the court to make a 
modification where there has been a substantial change 
in the material circumstances of either one or both of 
the parties since the decree was entered. An application 
for a modification should be subjected to thorough 
scrutiny by the court. There are many factors that can 
have a bearing on the resolution of the question." 
(Our emphasis) 
However reluctant the court should be to disturb the de-
decree where it is based upon evidence received by the court and 
repre~ents the court's judgment of what the obligations of the 
parties should be, that reluctance should be strongly fortified 
where the decree is based on an agreement between the parties 
covering property settlement as well as child and spousal sup-
port. There is support in the cases for the proposition that a 
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decree cannot be modified without the consent of the parties 
where it is based on a stipulation covering all aspects of prop-
erty and income division. The editors of American Jurispru-
dence (24 Am Jur 2d 789, Divorce Section 670) say this on 
the Stibject: 
"A contract of property settlement which also 
provides for alimony, if approved by the decree of the 
divorce court, becomes forever binding upon the parties, 
and neither the contract nor the decree adopting it may 
be revoked or modified without the consent of the 
parties." 
The concept that a court should be particularly slow to 
modify a decree based on stipulation was recognized by this 
court in Bott v. Bott, 20 U2d 329, 437 P2d 684. In that case, 
the court commented on the basis for the trial court's retention 
of jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree. "Especially should 
this be true" (i.e., that the court retains jurisdiction), said 
Justice Ellett, "when the parties voluntarily litigate a matter 
over which the court has jurisdiction." 
In the instant case, the parties did not voluntarily litigate 
their cause, they negotiated a settlement agreement which the 
court adopted as its decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court has completely reformed the parties' agree-
ment and the decree which issued from it. The court has elimi-
nated alimony and split custody on no evidence of wrong doing 
on Appellant's part whatsoever. 
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Because you dared to restructure your life and put your 
talent and education to use, said the court to Appellant, and 
because you have assumed the professional role which best 
permits you to supervise your children adequately, the court 
is going to penalize you by taking away all support and even 
taking your children from you for one-sixth of each year. 
The approach of the trial court is totally out of harmony 
with the views of this court. The court's refusal to hear evi-
dence on factors which should be of controlling influence was 
error. The order modifying the decree should be annulled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
3 51 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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